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SPEECH ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND
CONCERN
R. George Wright*
INTRODUCTION
Some of the most difficult problems in legal analysis involve concepts that
are slippery and amorphous but indispensible to the adjudication of cases.
The distinction between speech on matters of public interest or concern and
speech that is not is one such concept. This vital distinction has proven
difficult to apply on a consistent, noncontroversial basis. The concept may
even qualify, under the logic of W.B. Gallie's classic article,' as an essentially
contested concept. The distinction between public, general interest speech
and other speech is especially vital when courts are deciding cases that may
involve important social interests and fundamental constitutional rights. The
focus of this Article will be on the judicial use of the distinction between
speech that is a matter of public or general interest or concern and speech
that is not. Courts sometimes blur this distinction by focusing on the matter
or the general subject of the speech rather than on the speech itself. 2 For
the sake of convenience, the distinction will be referred to as one between
speech on matters of public interest or concern (MOPIC) and speech that is
not (non-MOPIC). These abbreviations are merely for the sake of conven-
ience, and are not intended to beg any'interesting questions.
While the MOPIC versus non-MOPIC distinction was important to the
classic Warren and Brandeis discussion of privacy rights,3 only recently has
it become central to the law of defamation and to the law of public employee
discharge or other disciplinary actions allegedly based on the employee's
protected speech. The central case in the defamation area is Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 4 and Connick v. Myers, is the central
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTLIAN SOCIETY 167
(1956).
2. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31 (1971) (plurality opinion)
("the report of an event of 'public or general interest') (citing Warren & Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HAjv. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)). Cf., e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986) (focusing instead on "whether the speech at issue is of
public concern").
3. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.
4. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion).
5. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Of course, the public interest or public concern nature of public
employee speech does not dictate a favorable result for the employee. The employee might have
beenterminated anyway for independent 'easons. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). There must also be, under Connick, a balancing of
legitimate free speech interests and the general interests of the employer in workplace discipline
and efficiency.
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case in the employee discharge area that was explicitly referred to in Green-
moss.
6
In Greenmoss, the plaintiff sued Dun & Bradstreet for distributing an
inaccurate credit report to the plaintiff's creditors. The plurality opinion in
Greenmoss referred to public or to individual "matter[s] ' ' 7 and "issue[s]" '
but concluded by declaring that the award of presumed or punitive damages
in the absence of any "actual malice" on the part of the libel defendant is
not a violation of the first amendment so long as the speech does not involve
matters of public concern. 9 In order to determine whether the allegedly
libelous speech addresses a matter of public concern, the court must examine
the speech's "content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole
record." 0
The dissent in Greenmoss disagreed with the plurality's characterization
of the Dun & Bradstreet credit report on Greenmoss Builders as not being
a matter of public concern." More importantly, however, the dissent observed
that the plurality had offered "almost no guidance as to what constitutes a
protected 'matter of public concern." '"12
In the area of libel law, judicial reactions to the Court's MOPIC versus
non-MOPIC distinction range from conceding its difficulty in application
to the more despairing characterization of the distinction as "amorphous
and undefinable.' '1 4 In the area of public employee dismissal, the reaction
has been similar. No clear definition of public concern has been established, 5
and the courts have had substantial difficulty in determining when speech
involves an issue of public concern.' 6 More importantly, the distinction, or
its underdevelopment, has resulted in substantial numbers of inconsistent,
6. 472 U.S. at 759.
7. Id. See also Meiklejohn, Public Speech and Libel Litigation: Are They Compatible?,
14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1986) (focusing on subject of general or public interest under
Rosenbloom).
8. 472 U.S. at 759.
9. Id. at 763 (thereby limiting the potential scope of such cases as New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 428 U.S. 323 (1974)).
10. 472 U.S. at 761 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48). This is an inquiry of law, rather
than fact. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7, 150 n.10.
11. 472 U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. Id. See also Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old Doctrine in
the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 241, 258 (1987) (standards for
whether a particular speech addresses a matter of public concern as being the "chief question
left unanswered by Greenmoss").
13. See, e.g., Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 268, 516 A.2d 1083, 1089 (1986) (quoting
Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 144, 516 A.2d 220, 229 (1986)).
14. Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1111 (Colo. 1982)
(en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting). See also Meiklejohn, supra note 7, at 551 (referring to the
Court's "great difficulty in defining the concept of 'public' in this context).
15. Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1987).
16. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1983).
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irreconcilable decisions in the frequently litigated public employee speech-
based dismissal cases.' 7
Determining whether or not speech is on a matter of public interest is
unavoidably problematic. The distinction invites an unusually high percentage
of subjective and arbitrary judicial decisions within a wide border zone of
close cases dividing the categories. The litigated cases tend to cluster in this
wide indeterminate "close case" area separating MOPICs from non-MOP-
ICs, resulting in large numbers of unpredictable case outcomes. Unfortu-
nately, this difficulty cannot be the sole consideration in deciding whether
to modify or dispense with the distinction between public interest and
nonpublic interest speech.
Particularly in sensitive areas involving important free speech rights, there
is a reluctance to accept easier-to-use substitutes for these speech categories,
even if the categories of MOPIC and non-MOPIC speech are themselves
difficult to apply. In addition, there exists a reluctance to trade off validity
or accuracy of a distinction for greater consistency or reliability. The MOPIC
versus non-MOPIC distinction appears to be indispensable. Given our basic
consensus with regard to the underlying values and purposes of the free
speech clause," it is a logically central distinction, for which there are no
good substitutes.
The Supreme Court has long held that not all kinds of speech are equal
in constitutional importance because not all kinds of speech implicate with
equal depth the central values thought to underlie the first amendment. 9
While speech on matters of purely private concern is not thought to be
utterly outside the scope of the first amendment, 20 MOPIC speech is thought
to be at the heart of the first amendment and receives the most stringent
constitutional protection.2 ' The Supreme Court has stated that "speech
17. See Note, The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A Proposal for a Fresh Start,
55 U. Cmt. L. REv. 449, 449 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The Public Employee's Right of Free
Speech] ("The lower federal courts have had difficulty applying the Supreme Court's balancing
test. Therefore, the decisions in this area are often times irreconcilable."); Note, Connick v.
Myers: New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights of Government Employees, 60 IND. L.J.
339, 358-59 & n.143 (1984-1985) [hereinafter Note, New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights]
(characterizing the distinction as unworkable; collecting assertedly mutually inconsistent federal
court cases).
18. Despite undeniable differences in emphasis, see Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521; Bloustein, The Origin, Validity, and
Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTOERS L.
REV. 372 (1981); Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 NW.
U.L. REV. 1137 (1984); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). If
there is any single article that defines themainstream in this area, though, it is probably
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
19. See Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 759-60.
20. Id. at 760; Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47.
21. See Greenmoss, 472 U.S. 749; Connick, 461 U.S. 138; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
1987]
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concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of
self government. '22 Non-MOPIC speech is not so central and accordingly
receives less protection. 23
The MOPIC versus non-MOPIC distinction thus reflects consensual judg-
ments as to the scope and purposes of, and values underlying the free speech
clause. Throughout much of the remainder of this Article, the most obvious
possible substitutes for this distinction will be considered and ultimately
rejected, on grounds such as ideological bias and susceptibility to partisan
abuse. The distinction cannot be dispensed with in favor of a more conven-
ient, less controversial distinction which does not so directly address fun-
damental free speech value concerns.
This is not to suggest that applying the MOPIC versus non-MOPIC speech
distinction is invariably difficult in practice. Some cases can be easily re-
solved.2 4 The obvious cases, those which clearly involve MOPIC or non-
MOPIC speech, can be resolved on just about any reasonable rationale of
the distinction involved. With regard to those clear cases, there is no need,
therefore, to compare and rank the alternative conceptions of how the
MOPIC distinction should be drawn. Only a few of the reported cases,
however, involve clearly MOPIC or non-MOPIC speech. What is needed,
therefore, is a theory for the unavoidably close, difficult, middle ground
cases that are tried and appealed.
The middle ground cases are allowed to be decided on, what might be
thought of as, strategic grounds due to the unavoidable closeness and
difficulty of the MOPIC or non-MOPIC issues involved. It violates no one's
rights, and is sound policy, to decide issues of MOPIC speech vel non, in
the middle ground close cases, with an eye toward promoting the range of
values or purposes underlying speech rights. 25
22. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964), quoted in both Greenmoss, 472 U.S.
at 759 and Connick, 461 U.S. at 145.
23. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 759; Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47.
24. Although the Supreme Court did not reach the issue, the congressional testimony of
Ernest Fitzgerald asserting two billion dollar cost overruns on the C5-A military transport
planes, among other matters, would clearly qualify as speech by a dismissed public employee
on a matter of general or public interest and concern, however this category was formulated.
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 734 (1982) (former management analyst with the
Department of the Air Force sued President Richard Nixon for retaliatory discharge during
department reorganization following unfavorable congressional testimony). It is an easy case
because a contrary result-finding that Fitzgerald's speech was essentially on a matter of
personal or private interest, however motivated-would be so implausible as to have no effect
other than to call the theory generating the contrary result into serious question, and because
a wide variety of formulations or approaches to the distinction will give the same result. For
another easy public employment discipline case, but one easily classified as a case not involving
speech on a matter of public interest, see Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam) (teacher's unwillingness to share a job with another teacher), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
823 (1984).
25. In a convenient, if not fully inclusive, summary of these values, Professor Emerson lists
assuring individual self-fulfillment, the pursuit or attainment of political truth, participation in
[Vol. 37:27
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Specifically, this Article seeks to increase consistency and predictability in
this range of close cases in a way that will promote first amendment values
by means of judicially structured incentives for potential speakers in both
public employee speech-based dismissal cases and in defamation cases. The
basic concept at the heart of this theory as applied to these middle range
cases, is to ask whether the speaker-the alleged defamer or the dismissed
public employee-could, under all the circumstances, have made at a practical
and low cost, the judicial issue of MOPIC vel non easier to resolve.
Costs for the speaker, under our theory, include those factors which
involve the distortion of any political message the speaker cares to convey,
as well as the financial costs borne by the speaker. In an ideologically neutral
way, the potential scope or breadth of the speaker's remarks can be consid-
ered, as well as the nature and size of the speaker's potential audience. If
all else is equal, it is more advantageous in terms of free speech values, on
which the litigant is in some sense seeking to rely, if the litigant's speech is
more general in its implications, rather than more narrow or particular; left
to be generalized only by the listener. It is also more advantageous in terms
of free speech values, if the speech is directed to more than one person, if
for no other reason than that democratic decision making requires26 broader
public discussion.
The all else equal qualifications cover a large number of important factors,
and the costs faced by a speaker who contemplates "broadening" his speech
can take a variety of forms. We have no desire to penalize, for example, a
litigant because the first, preliminary draft of a speech was not intended for
any audience, or because the litigant chose to pursue an employment-related
matter first through authorized channels, rather than immediately firing off
a letter to the editor, or speaking to a newspaper reporter on the basis of
unripe, undocumented suspicions.
A number of possible objections are dealt with below, in the context of
particular cases. For the moment, it may suffice to note that it is undesirable
that a judge evaluate the importance or the cogency of the speech at issue.
The risk of decisions on the basis of ideological bias in this area outweigh
any possible advantages. In addition, the judge should not be asked to
answer the unanswerable question of whether the speech at issue was, as
uttered, general or not general in some absolute sense. Under our analysis,
the free speech clause should offer protection not only to ambitious, sweeping
abstraction and theory, but, in the common middle range of cases, to those
speakers who have done their reasonable, cost-effective best under the cir-
cumstances to "generalize" the content and audience of their allegedly
protected speech. The term generalizing does not mean to identify or en-
courage making a speech simply more vague, or robbing a speech of partic-
democratic decision making, and maintaining abalance between social stability and change. See
Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79 (1963).
26. See id.
19871
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ularity, concreteness, and detail. Instead the term generalizing means the
drawing of broader inferences or of more encompassing conclusions by the
speaker or audience. It is instead simpler to say whether a speaker, given
her actual abilities, could have easily further generalized the speech, with
the qualifications outlined above. Under the MOPIC distinction, the speaker,
rather than the creative audience, is the first to generalize or draw out the
implications he intends the speech to convey.2 7 There is, however, a limit to
how far we will require the speaker to generalize her speech before it becomes
a clear case of speech on a MOPIC.
Certain anomalies are admittedly possible under the MOPIC/non-MOPIC
approach. For example, imagine two separate speech instances that are
neither easy MOPICs nor easy non-MOPICs. Both are therefore within the
middle range cases that result in of doubtful, unpredictable decisions such
as the cases discussed above. Suppose that speech instance A is closer on
the spectrum to being a clear MOPIC speech than speech instance B. But
suppose that B, but not A, is speech that cannot be further generalized at
low cost under the circumstances. This would mean, in effect, that a judge
could say of A, but not of B, that the speaker could easily have further
generalized his message, or could have easily expanded his potential audience,
but failed to do so. Under this approach, B, and not A, would be ruled
speech on a matter of general or public interest and concern.
This result, though, is hardly upsetting. It depends upon the assumption
that the courts can otherwise begin to make principled, accurate, consistent
decisions in the common middle ground cases, a development which shows
no signs of arising. The approach outlined here is fair in that it takes
speakers as they are, with their limitations, who want to take advantage of
the free speech clause, and asks only that they have walked through any
open doors toward fuller implication of the values underlying the free speech
clause. The incentive based approach is further justified by the frequent
defense raised by speakers to the effect that they should be considered
experts on the subject in question, informing the public on matters of
potential public significance. 28 It is not amiss to ask experts not to simply
disdain opportunities to couch their message more impersonally, or more
broadly, in view of the interests they themselves assume to be at stake.
The approach outlined here also has the virtue of avoiding a motive
inquiry by courts in difficult cases, where the speaker's motive is often
27. It may be that a person's demanding something for himself commits him to the more
general implication that everyone relevantly similarly situated is similarly so entitled. See the
development of similar conceptions of moral reasoning in M. SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN
ETHICS 17, 19-20, 24 (1961) and, over time, in R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (rev. ed.
1961); R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963); R. HARE, MoRAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD
AND POINT (1981). Under the outlined theory, the trick for the speaker is not simply to say
something that can be further generalized, but to bump up against some substantial obstacle
to further generalization.
28. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968); Note, The Public Employee's
Right of Free Speech, supra note 17, at 454.
[Vol. 37:27
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mixed, consisting of a desire to promote both purely personal as well as
more impersonal interests. 29 Equally important, our incentive based approach
reduces the risk that the uncertainties in our middle ground cases will tend
to chill constructive critical speech,30 along with reducing the uncertainties
themselves. A speaker who wants to be classified as speaking on a matter
of public interest, if her case is otherwise close, can formulate her speech in
such a way as to bump up against detectable obstacles to further generali-
zation of content and audience. The incentive approach thus lends some
measure of predictability to judicial results," thereby reducing the realistic
basis for any chilling effect of the protection-worthy speech that this ap-
proach encourages.
I. THE LIMITED CONTRIBUTION OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
However the concept of a matter of public or general interest or concern
is formulated, the distinction between the public and the private or personal,
and between the various senses of public interest, are unavoidable. Such
distinctions are notoriously problematic, but they can help crystalize precisely
what ought to be encouraged in order to promote and defend the values
underlying freedom of speech.
It has been rightly recognized that "disputes over the boundaries between
the 'public' and 'private' realms are among the central issues of public moral
discourse." '3 2 Private and public activities may be thought to be in fact
inseparable.33 Private and public may be thought to be simply alternative
aspects of the same interest.34 The more general public versus private dis-
tinction has drawn increasing criticism. 5
There is much that rings true in Professor Duncan Kennedy's well known
discussion of the conceptual disintegration of the public versus private
29. Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 (undertaking a rather subtle inquiry into the discharged
speaker's subjective motivations); Note, New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights, supra
note 17, at 360-61.
30. See Note, New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights, supra note 17, at 340.
31. The proposed theory cannot ignore the potential for unpredictability because speeches
of identical content, subject matter, and audience, may or may not be accorded MOPIC status,
depending upon the speaker's ability at the time to easily generalize. Context makes a difference
on most theories, and this is clearly not a case in which the ready generalizability theory treats
like cases as unlike. That one speaker of the same speech could have readily generalized, under
the circumstances, and another could not have generalized his speech is simply a constitutionally
relevant distinction between the cases.
32. Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. RaV. 175, 177 (1986) (emphasis in
original).
33. See Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1294-96 (1984); Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice:
The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1006 (1987).
34. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 981
(1987).
35. See Seidman, supra note 33, at 1007.
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distinction.36 Even if it is true, however, that "one simply loses one's ability
to take the public/private distinction seriously as a description, as an expla-
nation, or as a justification of anything," '3 7 it is hardly clear what follows
from this line of reasoning by analyzing the cases examined in this Article.
The distinction, in the abstract, between the public and the private may in
fact be prone to unravel. Adjectives are not employed, however, simply in
the abstract. The terms public or private, in this sense, have referents. There
is no inherent dynamic of staged decline in the concept of, for example, a
public telephone. An individual can walk into a drugstore today, inquire
after a public phone, and provoke no greater demand for clarification today,
or tomorrow, than fifty years ago. If the concept of public telephone is not
pellucid and sharp-edged, it is at least serviceable and can be widely employed
in consistent fashion. The question then becomes whether public and private
interests are more like the concept of public and private phones, or like the
concept of public and private in the abstract.
For the skeptics, the concept of a public interest, or the public interest,
is hardly more tractable than how Professor Kennedy would view the broader
public-private distinction. It has been said, for example, that "there is no
public-interest theory worthy of the name . . . . "I More specifically, the
argument has been made that judges are unable to make principled distinc-
tions between public interests and private interests. 9 The concept of public
interest may indeed be in a "state of confusion," 40 but it may equally clearly
be indispensable, in light of our collectively accepted values. 4' Fortunately,
the concept of the public interest need not be entirely clear and unequivocal
in order to do some practical work, and it need not be made so in order to
make progress along the lines suggested by this Article.
One crucial observation, validated by examining the relevant case opinions,
is that the concept of public interest may be used in some contexts in a
36. See generally Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982). If, for example, the term "political" is to be used as broadly as
Professor Perry contends it must, one's reaction may be no less a sense of the decline of the
utility of the concept of the political than a sense of pathbreaking liberation. See Perry, supra
note 18, at 1160. At such points, one turns with profit to Kennedy's essay.
37. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1357.
38. G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 223 (1960). For someattempts to sort out concep-
tions of the public interest in connection with public interest law, see Weisbrod, Conceptual
Perspectives on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis, in B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER, &
N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 4, 26-29
(1978).
39. Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 925 (1987).
40. V. HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 18 (1970). Some order may
be rendered out of the apparent chaos by recognizing that the notion of the public, or of the
public interest, may be essentially contested in the sense described by W.B. Gallie. See Gallie,
supra note 1, at 169. The "public interest" may well be among those "concepts the proper use
of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users."
Id. at 169. For Gallie's list of criteria for recognizing essentially contested concepts, see id. at
171-72.
41. See V. HELD, supra note 40, at 18; R. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 13 (1966).
[Vol. 37:27
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subjective sense-what does the public actually care about, or concern itself
with? 42 "Public interest," however, is also used in a more objective sense,
in which something may be a matter of public interest even if no one, or
only a few people, happen to recognize it as such, or subjectively care about
the matter.4 3 For example, an obscure scientist may draft an early paper on
the depletion of the ozone layer, or an obscure political group may publish
its radical manifesto. Both are matters of public interest, whether or not the
public, or any significant segment of the public, cares about either the speech
or the subject matter.
The recognizable free speech values" may be implicated by at least some
speech on matters of public interest in the subjective sense. It is equally
clear, however, that such free speech values may be deeply implicated by
some speech that concerns a matter of public interest in only the normative
or objective sense. A contrary result would mean that a government that
successfully brainwashed or intimidated the public into indifference with
regard to political matters could rightly claim that discussion of such matters
was then not on any matter of public interest. Dissenting speech would, on
such a theory, fail the tests of Connick and Greenmoss, as the speech would
not draw significant attention and comment. Any sensible theory of free
speech must pose greater problems for a totalitarian regime than that.
The role of the more objective sense of public interest should emphasize
the potentially misleading quality of the more subjective formulation of
matters of public concern. It is true that cases such as Connick and Green-
moss refer more commonly to public "concern" rather than to public
"interest." The logic of these two cases commits them, however, to attend
to more than merely subjective concerns of the public. Both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have treated public concern as synonymous
with public interest . 4 Even where the Court refers to "speech on matters of
42. See R. FLATHMAN, supra note 41, at 16-17. It is in this sense that the alleged restaurant
behavior of a celebrity such as Carol Burnett may be a matter of public interest. See Burnett
v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed,
465 U.S. 1014 (1984). But see Meiklejohn, supra note 7, at 557 (discussing arguable public
interest implications of defendant's speech for Burnett's anti-alcoholism activities).
43. See R. FLATHMAN, supra note 41, at 17; Sorauf, The Conceptual Muddle, in NoMos V:
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 183, 186 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
44. See supra note 25.
45. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (test formulation in
public employee discharge case focusing on the right to comment on matters of public interest);
Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff employee's speech did not involve
matters of public interest), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Collins v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp.
1464, 1468 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (citing the public interest language from Pickering), aff'd per
curiam, 734 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1984). The antithesis of MOPIC speech is often thought to be
speech that seeks to promote only personal or individual interest, in an evidently objective
sense. See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984)
(petitioner was fired when she revealed her bisexual preferences), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009
(1985). While the courts sometimes use the term "interest" in an arguably subjective sense,
they may focus narrowly on more attention-independent concepts. Compare Wilson v. City of
1987]
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public concern," '46 it is evident that the Court desires to protect "speech that
matters" or speech concerning "the legitimacy of the political process, ' '1 7
whether or not the speech is popularly accepted, or whether or not the
speech rouses the attention of the media, or of any significant element of
the public.
The Court would prefer to inquire into not whether the speech itself
matters, but, as a minimum improvement, whether the subject of the speech
matters. The latter inquiry, though still controversial, is somewhat less subject
to ideological abuse. It is easier to say that speech from an unpopular
political viewpoint does not matter than it is to say that its subject-the
legitimacy of the political process, for example-does not matter. Similarly,
any judicial inquiry into whether the speech is important, or even on an
important issue or concern, should be avoided. While an "important/un-
important" distinction has some judicial currency,48 the potential for arbi-
trary or politicized use of such a classification renders it unworkable.49
To the extent that courts may prefer to think in terms of matters of public
interest, rather than matters of public concern, they should, from the per-
spective of promoting and defending free speech values, construe public
interest in a broad sense. Professor David Braybrooke has pointed out, for
Littleton, 732 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1984) (formulation of a topic of general interest to the
public) with Greenberg v. Kmetko, 811 F.2d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir.) (focusing on the existence
of speech on a matter of public importance), reh'g granted, vacated en banc, 820 F.2d 897
(7th Cir. 1987).
In the libel area, the Court has similarly used the termspublic interest and public concern
interchangeably. Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (speech refers to a matter of public or general interest) and Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1973) (issues of general or public interest) with Rosen'bloom, 403 U.S.
at 44 (plurality opinion) (speech issues of public or general concern) and Greenmoss, 472 U.S.
at 762 (plurality opinion) (focusing on whether or not a matter of public concern existed, but
opposing this to "speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience.").
The Court's most recent formulation in the libel area refers to "speech on matters of public
concern," but seeks to protect, inter alia, speech on "the legitimacy of the political process,"
on the grounds that such speech clearly "matters." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 (1986). The latter considerations are more independent of public attitude.
For a sample of recent libel cases using in form or effect a public interest formulation, see
Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 533 (10th Cir. 1987); Bagley v. Iowa
Beef Processors, Inc. (In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litigation), 797 F.2d 632,
645 (8th Cir. 1986) (public concern formulation, but defined in terms of potential impact
beyond the parties), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1293 (1987); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing
Co., 104 N.J. 125, 145, 516 A.2d 220, 230 (1986).
46. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 (1986).
47. Id.
48. See Greenberg v. Kmetko, 811 F.2d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir.), reh'g granted, vacated en
banc, 820 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1987); Meiklejohn, supra note 7, at 556; Note, The Public
Employee's Right of Free Speech, supra note 17, at 454; Note, The Evolution of a Public
Issue: New York Times Through Greenmoss, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 773, 775 (1986).
49. See Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line
School District, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 217, 231 (1980).
PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONCERN
example, that some issues-desegregation or slavery versus emancipation-
are discussed and debated in terms of human rights, the demands of justice,
or freedom, rather than through consideration of the public interest.5 0 Nar-
rowly conceived, the public interest may seem too calculative or merely too
aggregative to capture what is at stake in such debates. Such matters, whether
anyone is actually concerned about them or not, must count as MOPICs on
any credible theory.
While public interest should be broadly construed in this sense, the aim
to promote and defend the values underlying the free speech clause may
lead to a decline in application of the term in some cases in which it would
seem literally applicable. Media gossip about celebrities, for example, is often
a subject in which much of the public happens to take a temporary actual
subjective interest or concern.5 If such gossip is, and is intended to be,
merely entertaining, without any implication for any public issue or potential
public issue, then there is a case to be made for declining to recognize such
speech as speech on a matter of public interest and concern. One should
consider the classic fusillade of Warren and Brandeis:
[Tihe supply creates the demand .... Even gossip apparently harmless,
when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles
and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things,
thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people . . . . Easy of
comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is
never wholly cast down . . . , no one can be surprised that it usurps the
place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at
once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling., 2
Warren and Brandeis show few qualms about presuming to distinguish
the important from the unimportant. While this is a course not without risk,
it can be said in their defense that they are not seeking to distinguish
important from unimportant political viewpoints, or issues. They would not
claim for themselves, or entrust in others, the power to neutrally and reliably
sort out important from trivial political ideas. Some judgments as to relative
importance in the realm of public policy are, however, both defensible and
inevitable. Generally, a constitutional right is more judicially important than
a conflicting nonconstitutional right or claim. The values commonly thought
to underlie the free speech clause53 may reasonably be said to be, for free
speech purposes, more important than other, unrelated values.
Even true mere gossip of the sort decried by Warren and Brandeis may
be said to not significantly promote, or in fact to inhibit, the realization of
the basic purposes underlying the free speech clause, even if multitudes
happen to take an interest in the matter. It is difficult to imagine how mere
50. See Braybrooke, The Public Interest: The Present and Future of the Concept, in NoMos
V: THE PUBLIC INTEREST 129, 131 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
51. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 25.
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gossip promotes self-development, contributes to the pursuit of political
truth, furthers democratic decision making, helps balance social stability and
change, or restrains governmental tyranny, any more than a wide variety of
other activities not protected by the free speech clause.5 4
Rather than dwell upon this unsympathetic point, we may note instead
that there is one other question on which some progress can be made at the
conceptual level. This is whether speech that is economic or commercial in
content, or that is about some commercial matter, can count as speech on
a matter of public interest. This question cannot be answered sensibly in the
abstract. One cannot simply take an instance of speech, see what broad type
or category the speech falls into, and grant or deny the speech MOPIC
status on that basis. One should instead, in applying the theory outlined
here, look to the breadth or narrowness of the particular speech, as actually
formulated by the speaker. In a close case, it should be determined whether
the speech could have been further generalized, under the circumstances, by
the speaker.
Merely being able to characterize the speech in question as economic or
commercial fails to indicate the constitutional importance of the speech."
More specifically, it is of little aid in sorting out speech on matters of public
interest from speech that is not on a matter of public interest. An economic
or commercial speech category could, for example, encompass speech on
everything from an American president's decision to run a large budget
deficit in order to suppress additional social spending demands, to an isolated
individual's own modest, short term, narrow pecuniary interests.
Focusing on the subject matter of the speech, rather than on the speech
itself, encourages the judicial error of focusing on the category of the speech,
with the category being taken by the court at its broadest, most expansive
level. This error is illustrated by the recent declaration of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 51 that
"matters of public interest include such essentials of life as food and water." 5 7
The court reasoned simply that "[als an essential of human life, drinking
water is a paradigm of legitimate public concern. For this decision, it suffices
to conclude that drinking water is such a subject." '
It is possible to do better than this, even without any judicial inquiry into
the importance or cogency of the particular speech at issue. There is a
detectable difference in level of generality of implication between "the town's
only drinking well is polluted," and "this particular bottle of mineral water
54. See supra note 25.
55. Cf. Note, The Evolution of a Public Issue, supra note 48, at 788 (contending that in
Greenmoss, the "most important factor to the Court was the factual, economic content of the
report").
56. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 134, 516 A.2d 220, 230
(1986).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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was flat." It need not be determined whether the speech may be easily
generalized to establish that these two statements, although they both address
a subject essential to human life, need not be considered equally as speech
on matters of public interest, in any context.
This skepticism as to the usefulness of broad categorization of a speech
as economic or commercial in order to resolve whether the speech is on a
matter of public interest does not imply, of course, that economics and
commerce are alien to free speech values. Free speech protection rightly
extends beyond the realm of the political, narrowly conceived.5 9 One reason
for this is that for many or all citizens, speech about some economic or
commercial matters may contain a considerable breadth of implication.
The reasoning of the recent Supreme Court decision in Greenmoss60 should
be viewed with suspicion because the decision tends to exclude the commercial
from the realm of matters of public interest.6 One portion of the Greenmoss
plurality's reasoning was that Dun & Bradstreet's credit report, falsely
reporting the bankruptcy of Greenmoss Builders to five subscribers on the
stipulation that the report was to be disseminated no further, was classifiable
as "hardy" speech. 62 It was thought to be "hardy" speech, in the sense that
the speech was less likely to be deterred by the threatened effects of state
libel law, since it was "solely motivated by the desire for profit. ' 63
The plurality's theory was that profit-motivated speech is less likely to be
deterred than speech from other motives. 64 This theory, despite judicial
acceptance, 6 does not carry sufficient plausibility to help with the MOPIC
distinction. Common sense suggests the possibility that speech motivated by
principle, as opposed to profit, may often be hardier. Ideological or religious
commitment, unto the extreme of martyrdom, might be crudely defined in
terms of the willingness of the speaker to risk substantial state imposed costs
for speaking. Much profit-driven speech, however, may be barely worthwhile
to the speaker, even in the absence of additional state regulation. It should
be expected that profit-driven speech would tend to be deterred, or in fact
59. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Meiklejohn, supra note 7, at 554-55.
60. See Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 762-63. For a representative commentary on Greenmoss,
see Comment, Punitive Damages in Actions for Libel: The "Public Concern" Test is Revived,
or the Resurrection of Rosenbloom, 32 Loy. L. REV. 521 (1986).
61. This is not to suggest that the Greenmoss plurality would be likely to find a coal
industry statement broadly disclaiming responsibility for acid rain to not be speech on a matter
of public interest, or a gasoline company ad discussing the topic of energy conservation.
62. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 762.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing the leading commercial speech case, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976)). See also Langvardt,
supra note 12, at 250; Note, The Evolution of a Public Issue, supra note 48, at 789.
65. See, e.g., Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 534 (10th Cir. 1987)
(commercial credit reports are hardy speech, unlikely to be deterred by state regulation).
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to cease, in situations where the anticipated costs exceed the marginal
revenues anticipated, 66 where the profit-motivated speech qualifies as a public
good,67 and where it does not.68
The assumption that profit-driven speech tends to be relatively hardy,
therefore, is doubtful. There is no need to overreact by being oversolicitous
of all commercial speech. It has been argued, for example, that "there is a
high degree of public interest in the kind of information obtained" 69 in credit
reports. The point is that courts easily can and should look beyond the kind
of speech involved-e.g., a credit report-to the actual and potential scope
of the audience and the message. At least some credit reports-perhaps
leaving unchanged the credit status of a small firm in a big city, where the
audience for the credit report is increasingly small-involve speech that is
simply not on a matter of public interest.
The limited circulation of a credit report is a legitimate consideration that
is entitled to some weight in the decision as to whether the credit report
should qualify as speech on a matter of public interest. 70 Limited circulation
of an idea, or even its purely private memorialization, does not necessarily
bar MOPIC status to the speech. 7' If all other factors are equal, however,
the larger the percentage of the relevant potential audience that the speaker
chooses to address, 72 the more constitutionally significant the speech be-
comes. 73 If for no other reason, because broader dissemination implies a
chance for wider participation by a greater audience, in democratic decision
making, and perhaps even a greater chance that the speech's contribution
to the search for political truth will be recognized.7 4 Thus it is an overstate-
ment to conclude, as the Tenth Circuit has in Sunward Corp. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc, 75 a recent libel case, that "the reports in Greenmoss and 340
reports here have no constitutional significance. '76 The scope of intended
audience is of some weight under this theory, though perhaps not of decisive
weight in the Tenth Circuit case.
66. See R. POSNER, ECONOmiC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch.I (3d ed. 1986).
67. See Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 20-23
(1986).
68. Even if a speaking corporation is able to obtain payment for the social benefits created
by its profit-driven speech, the speech may well be on a matter of public interest. An example
might be one oligopolist's reporting that all of the production of a fellow oligopolist has been
poisoned.
69. Langvardt, supra note 12, at 256.
70. Cf. id. (arguing for the irrelevance of such a consideration).
71. See id.
72. See supra note 25.
73. It may be too costly for Dun & Bradstreet to broaden its audience for its speech on
matters of potential public interest, in light of its contractual commitments to its subscribers,
and the commercial absurdity of doing so in this situation.
74. See supra note 25.
75. Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 533 (10th Cir. 1987).
76. Id.
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Overall, those who have expressed anxiety over the Court's refusal to find
speech on a matter of public concern in Greenmoss can take some comfort
from the developing case law. Even in the face of Greenmoss, lower courts
recently have found speech that is largely about economic or commercial
matters is speech on a matter of public interest. These recent cases involve
such matters as the propriety of a bank's loans to its former president and
founder,17 a magazine's loosely described "investment advice" about a rival
investment opportunities magazine 78 a local timeshare condominium contro-
versy where the libel plaintiff was simultaneously running for town council,' 9
and newspaper articles describing the financial dealings of private plaintiffs
who were then the subject of numerous regulatory and law enforcement
investigations.8 0 There evidently has been no judicial rush to conclude that
the presence of economic or commercial subject matter elements disqualifies
the speech at issue from MOPIC status.
II. APPLYING THE READY GENERALIZABILTY TEST TO THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE CASES
The number of cases in the federal appellate courts in which a public
employee has sought redress for being disciplined allegedly because of what
the employee asserts to be speech on a matter of public interest is quite
substantial and is growing rapidly. Here, the ready generalizability speech
test can only be illustrated rather than fairly tested. There will be some
public employee speech dismissal cases which can be easily decided and in
which the particular theory used to reach the result, against or in favor of
MOPIC status, will be largely immaterial." There are no recent obvious
cases in this sense where the court found the speech to be on a MOPIC,
and the ready generalizability theory, if applied, would have suggested a
contrary result. There is, however, one case in which the speech could have
been determined as a MOPIC under any theory, but the court, contrary to
all logic, failed to find the speech to be on a MOPIC. The best that can be
hoped for is that this case is simply a rare aberration, defensible on no
cogent theory.
This single incongruous case, Mings v. Department of Justice,8 2 may best
be explained as a judicial overreaction to unattractive facts. The petitioner
in Mings had been removed in 1985 from his job as a border patrol agent
in Lubbock, Texas.8 3 The petitioner's removal was based in part on the
77. Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 516 A.2d 1083, 1089 (1986).
78. J.F. Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356, 362 (lth Cir. 1987).
79. McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1987).
80. Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1104, 1106 (Colo.
1982) (en banc) (decided prior to Greenmoss).
81. Perhaps the best known possible example of this kind of case would be the alleged fact
situation in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). See supra note 24.
82. 813 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
83. Id. at 386.
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content of a letter he wrote on official stationery to an agency assistant
district director for investigations .4 The Merit Systems Protection Board and
the federal circuit found the letter to contain "insulting and abusive language
disparaging Catholics, Hispanics and agency employees." 85
The letter partially focused on a particular agency form, 1-293, which was
used nationwide by the Immigration and Nationalization Service to notify
aliens of the holding of hearings and the dates and locations of those
hearings. 16 The letter's references to this form may help account for why the
letter was sent to a responsible internal official, rather than to a newspaper,
for example, if any such explanation is required. The thrust of the petitioner's
letter was much broader than a simple quibble over the drafting of some
obscure internal government form.
The transition from a complaint above a form to a sweeping complaint
about a broad, plainly controversial, government policy began with the
petitioner's assertion that "[aill the 1-293 accomplishes is to give an illegal
alien more time to become further entrenched and hinder the Service efforts
in removing him." 87 The focus of the letter then broadened to a level of
panoptic generality: the petitioner's study of the history of predominantly
Catholic countries had allowed him to conclude that "all them are corrupt,
backward, beggarly countries." '88 The essential thrust of the letter, however,
was unmistakable; that the Service is too lax, from the point of view of the
broad national interest, in processing and deporting undocumented aliens,
due to factors such as endemic, pervasive ignorance, disloyalty, or incom-
petence.
This brief summary of the letter in question fairly depicts its thrust. At
points, the level of generality that is reached is nearly Weberian. It is clear
that the writer was concerned preeminently with the merits of broad national
policy, and not simply with the technicalities of forms, internal procedures,
intra-office bickering, or individual cases and officers. It would also be
disingenuous to claim that the subject of the undue laxity, or undue severity
or oppressiveness, of treatment of alleged illegal immigrants along the Mex-
ican border was not a matter of public interest in 1984, at least to a significant
sector of the public.
Mings represents an obvious case, as it seems readily manageable on any
theory of MOPIC speech, and can fall under the ready generalizability theory
as well, as it seems impertinent to ask whether the border control agent who
wrote the letter could have cheaply broadened the relevant scope of his
focus. Additionally, the case seems manageable on the issue of MOPIC vel
non on any of a variety of approaches. Unfortunately, the court of appeals
reached a flatly contrary result. The court conceded that although the letter
84. Id.
85. Id. at 386, 388.
86. Id. at 386.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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was understandably directed to a responsible agency official rather than to
the public at large, that fact would not preclude a finding of MOPIC status.8 9
The court concluded, however, that the content of the letter was more in
the nature of a personal, internal agency grievance relating to a particular
agency form, and that the petitioner's speech was therefore on a matter of
only personal interest, rather than on a matter of public concern or debate. 90
A fair reading of the letter as reported by the court of appeals makes the
court's conclusion in this respect strained at best. Clearly the problem is
that it is not easy to give the letter a fair reading. Certain statements in the
letter are scurrilous. A fair minded court could read the letter and conclude
that the Service did not act unreasonably in removing the petitioner from
his position on other growads. The letter itself suggests the petitioner's
inability to perform satisfactorily in certain job-related respects.
What the court of appeals could have done instead, as Connick v. Meyers9'
makes quite clear, is to have decided the case against the speaker without
the absurd conclusion that the actual content of the letter did not relate to
a matter of legitimate public concern. Under Connick, as derived from
Pickering v. Board of Education,92 the court could have granted the fact
that the petitioner's speech addressed a matter of public interest. The court
could have then barred his recovery by finding, as a matter of law, that the
employee's free speech interest in this case was outweighed by the Service's
interest in the fair and efficient operation of its programs. 93 The court of
appeals in this case, though well aware of this escape route,94 chose not to
use it, perhaps out of an unconscious distaste for the viewpoint expressed
in the letter.
In any event, Mings can be fairly characterized as a rare aberration. 95 Few
legal tests on central, frequently litigated matters can effortlessly account
for all judicial opinions, without exception. The operation of the ready
generalizability approach will be illustrated next by filling in the cells of the
matrix of possibilities.
89. See id. at 388 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413
(1979)).
90. See Mings, 813 F.2d at 388.
91. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
92. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
93. See 461 U.S. at 142. Under Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977), the government may prevail by showing that the same discipline would
have been taken against the employee for reasons independent of his protected speech.
94. See Mings, 813 F.2d at 837, 838-39.
95. Cf. Jungels v. Pierce, 638 F. Supp 317 (N.D. Ill. 1986) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 825
F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1987). In Jungels, the letter at issue was written to a newspaper by a part-
time local civil service commissioner regarding the allocation of public funds to the city's
Hispanic community. The trial court found that certain remarks and the tone of the letter in
general disparaged Hispanics. Id. at 321. In view of the reasonable inference of bias and the
possibility of disruptive litigation in the future pointing in part to the letter in question, the
writer's discharge was upheld. But the court held this only after admitting that the letter at
issue dealt with matters of public concern. Id.
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III. CLOSE CASES ON THE MOPIC IssuE IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGE
One difficulty in testing the normative appeal of our approach is that the
courts are not in a position to retroactively adopt this theory, and therefore
their published opinions have often not focused on, or even reported, the
actual language used by the speaker, but instead label to the general category
the speech might be said to fall into. Rather than examining the degree of
generality of the actual speech, some courts simply describe the speech at
issue and do not reproduce the language employed. Not having the actual
language, or excerpts therefrom, reproduced in the opinion, one can only
guess as to how the MOPIC issue would be decided under the proposed
theory in this Article. In some cases, though, a call can be hazarded.
As a reminder, the theory is intended only for the quite common, middle
ground, close cases on which reasonable minds differ. The hope is not to
show the unreasonableness of contrary judicial results, but to encourage
more valuable speech activity and to reward or sanction the speaker in a
given case, based on the speaker's reasonable utilization of the speech
opportunities available under the circumstances.
With this caveat, we may consider the recent case of Ohse v. Hughes.96
In this case, the plaintiff was terminated from his job as an Adult Probation
Officer. From one perspective, it seems appropriate, based on the reported
facts, to view the case as simply a garden variety intra-office squabble based
on the speaker's own interests being thwarted because the situation was
either caused or exacerbated by friction between the plaintiff speaker and
the Chief Probation Officer. 97 The plaintiff's speech, however self-serving
or otherwise questionably motivated, and however unrelated to the genuine
causes of his dissatisfaction, bears some examination.
The appellate court, while not reproducing the language actually employed,
indicated that the plaintiff detailed9" serious abuses in a publicly funded
probation office that were later admitted to be true by the chief of the
office. 99 Ohse revealed the drinking of alcohol by probation employees during
business hours, the falsifying of mileage charges to cover meal expenses, the
inappropriate taking of sick and vacation days, situations where [chief
probation officer] Hughes misappropriated public funds for unauthorized
uses, and that members of the office were sleeping on the job. °° While these
alleged abuses might be considered not surprising or petty when viewed
individually or even collectively, the Seventh Circuit found it clear that these
96. 816 F.2d at 1144 (7th Cir. 1987).
97. See id. at 1146.
98. Primarily to relevant supervisory personnel. See id. at 1146-47.
99. There should be no inference that speech cannot be on a matter of public interest if it
is an untestable or false opinion.
100. Id. at 1151.
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occurrences involved matters of "public concern which would trigger 'debate
• ..vital to an informed decision making by the electorate." 0'0
The crucial determinant under the ready generalizability theory would
require an inquiry into whether, under the circumstances, the employee-
speaker could, without distorting his message and without changing his own
basic, personal capabilities, have significantly generalized his message, at low
cost, so as to more clearly or significantly implicate the basic free speech
values. 102
In Ohse, apparently no significant low cost generalization was possible. It
was not that the plaintiff's speech focused on isolated incidents or mere
particular personalities, where a broader lesson was begging to be drawn.
The theme of the plaintiff's speech appeared to describe a continuing,
systemic pattern of modest corruption or abuse of the public trust. It is
simply not clear where the plaintiff would be expected to go in terms of
significant further generalization. Putting the matter in broader historical or
sociological perspective would not ordinarily be expected of someone in the
plaintiff's position. Any such exertion on the part of the plaintiff would
seem gratuitous and contrived. Similarly, the plaintiff could reasonably have
been chastised for broadening the audience for his accusations to include
the general public at this stage, before the responsible officials had a chance
to examine and evaluate his charges.
As has been demonstrated, there need be no fear that deciding close
MOPIC issues in this fashion will allow culpable public employees to hide
behind a smokescreen of talk on matters of public interest. The court may
decide as a matter of law'03 that the interests of the plaintiff in speaking out
on matters of public concern is outweighed by the government's interest, as
employer, in efficiently organized public offices. o, One can only assume, of
course, that courts also take into consideration the public's interest in the
speech, as well as the interests of the speaker, and that courts appreciate
that the plaintiff's speech might tend to enhance, as well as impair, the
efficient operation of the agency. 105
101. Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968)).
102. See supra note 25.
103. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7, 150 n.10 (deciding as a matter of law, and in
light of the entire record, that a government employee's inner office questionnaire concerning
office policy involved, in part, an issue of public concern); Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426,
430 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987) (deciding as a matter of law that an entomologist's public criticism of
an insect eradication project was of public concern.).
104. See Ohse, 816 F.2d at 1151 (quoting Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 839 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 36 (1985)). See also Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (finding government interest stronger when a federal employee orally criticized a budget
reducing furlough plan at an employee meeting: "the part of a 'good government' partisan is
no doubt very attractive as the last refuge of the incompetent ordiscontented"), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1050 (1985).
105. As additional possible examples of close cases that may involve speech on MOPICs,
under the proposed theory and as found by the court, consider Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426
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As a further test of the ready generalizability theory, the related close
cases may be considered in which the theory would find a MOPIC, but in
which the court did not in fact so find. A possible example of this sort of
case is Smith v. Wythe-Grayson Regional Library Board.1°6 In Smith, the
plaintiff alleged that she had been terminated from her position as a public
librarian based at least in part on her constitutionally protected speech.
0 7
The court, however, held that her speech did not address a matter of public
concern. 08 The court indicated in this regard that:
at a Library Board meeting, Mrs. Smith felt the amount being offered to
the library system by the United Way was not adequate and hardly worth
pursuing. I believe that this kind of statement in reality does not deal with
a matter of public concern in that the public would probably have little
or no interest, other than tangentially, in the exact amount of money that
came to the library system through the United Way.'°'
This appears to be a close case, and under our theory it is difficult to
resolve without a more precise account of what the plaintiff actually said.
Clearly, the plaintiff was not focusing essentially on some personal griev-
ance. 10 The court may in fact be unfairly degeneralizing the speaker's
remarks, as described above, by characterizing them as focused on "the
exact amount of money" involved."' The court's own prior description
seems to suggest the possibility that the speaker was, in a broader sense,
advocating that the library system consider dropping out of the United Way
entirely."' It may be said that the speaker's remarks could be generalized
even further, by arguing that the logic of the library system's dropping out
of the United Way should apply to other United Way participants as well.
There is no indication, however, that the speaker was in a position to
responsibly make such a generalization.
Smith may therefore represent a close case of speech that should be
considered as being on a matter of public interest. Other recent public
employee discipline cases may also fall into this category, despite the courts'
holding otherwise. Representative examples may include Fiorillo v. United
(9th Cir. 1987) (protecting public criticism by state entomologist focusing on alleged under-
statement of extent of California medfly infestation); Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th
Cir. 1986) (protecting request by teacher and nine others for official investigation of public
school principal on thirty-five grounds), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1287 (1987).
106. 657 F. Supp. 1216 (W.D. Va. 1987).
107. Id. at 1219.
108. Id. at 1220.
109. Id.
110. This does not mean that merely personal grievances are necessarily easily generalized,
but that personal grievances may not be found to be matters of public interest, under any
number of theories.
Ill. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 1220.
112. See id.
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States Department of Justice"3 and Yoggerst v. Hedges."14 Fiorillo is of
special interest because of the court's conclusion that "[i]t is the nature of
the whole communication that must be reviewed to determine whether it is
of 'public concern'-not sentences taken in isolation.""' 5 This rule has the
appearance of noncontroversial common sense, but on reflection, it cannot
be right.
Imagine a long speech in which the speaker utters exactly one sentence
that, in isolation, was clearly and indisputably on a matter of public interest.
The court may, under the Fiorillo approach, decide that the speech as a
whole was not on a matter of public interest. If so, the case is over, and
the employee loses. What if, however, the employer cared only about the
single sentence that in isolation was on a matter of public interest? What if
the employer fired the speaker for only that sentence, with no other grounds?
The underlying policy logic of the case law and the values underlying the
free speech clause would require the kind of interest balancing inquiry
between employer and employee that is only triggered after the initial finding
of speech on a matter of public interest has been found.
To balance out the examination of the public employment discipline cases,
the categories of close cases in which the ready generalizability theory would
yield a finding of no speech on a matter of public interest will be examined.
The judicial resolution of the recent reported cases is mixed, with some
courts finding speech on a MOPIC where application of the ready general-
izability theory would have resulted in a finding of non-MOPIC speech.
McKinley v. City of Eloy," 6 is representative of these cases. McKinley
involved a probationary police officer who was dismissed for allegedly
criticizing, in a news interview and a city council meeting," 7 the City's
decision not to give police officers an annual raise." 8 The Ninth Circuit
began by correctly refusing to judicially close the class of potential matters
of public interest, recognizing instead the constitutional intent "to permit
the public to decide for itself which issues and viewpoints merit its con-
cern.""19 The Ninth Circuit may have erred, under this theory, by apparently
generalizing the speech for the speaker itself.
113. 795 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (petitioner's claim that prison was still saturated with
corruption found by the court to be stale news).
114. 739 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1984) (petitioner's expression of happiness to co-worker concerning
her superior's discharge not protected; the petitioner was penalized by Seventh Circuit for
failing to overtly articulate assumptions that were presumably clear to the listener from previous
conversations with the speaker).
115. Fiorillo, 795 F.2d at 1550. See also Greenberg v. Kmetko, 811 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th
Cir.) (comments made by speaker are to be considered as a whole), reh 'g granted, vacated en
banc, 820 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1987).
116. 705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983).
117. Id. at 1115.
118. Id. at 1112.
119. Id. at 1114 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
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Because the Ninth Circuit opinion does not indicate the level of generali-
zation of the plaintiff's remarks, it is not entirely clear how broad the
plaintiff's actual or fairly implied focus was, and how much breadth was
simply supplied by the court on review. 20 To the extent that the plaintiff's
speech focused on the strength of desire or need of the police officers for
an annual raise, and their frustration, anger, or disappointment with the
City over this issue,' 2 1 his speech seems readily generalizable, hence not
MOPIC speech under the theory. The court's own observation that at least
beyond some point, "compensation levels undoubtedly affect the ability of
the city to attract and retain qualified police personnel' 22 merely indicates
how easily the speaker could have added, through relevant further generali-
zation, to the clarity of the MOPIC issue, assuming his speech did not in
fact address such issues.
A case bordering this category, and on which the Supreme Court has
recently shed some light, is Rankin v. McPherson.2 1 Plaintiff McPherson
was terminated from her clerical position at a county constable's office
when, upon learning of the attempted assassination of President Reagan,
she stated to a co-worker, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him.' '
24
The trial court found that the language was seriously meant and not merely
political hyperbole, that the plaintiff's language was not speech on a matter
of public interest, and that the constable's office need not be "required to
employ a person who 'rides with the cops and cheers for the robbers."" ' 25
The Fifth Circuit reversed, however, finding the plaintiff's speech to be on
a matter of public interest, and that her position was too ministerial to be
expected to have significant potential for office disruption, efficiency, or
morale. 126
The Supreme Court in affirming the Fifth Circuit focused on the undoubted
truth that "the life and death of the President are obviously matters of
public concern.' ' 27 The plaintiff's speech, however, was causally remote
from the actual assassination event, or any subsequent events. Under the
ready generalizability theory, her speech would, as a close case, be considered
speech on a matter of public interest, unless several assumptions are made.
If her remarks were simply a bare expression of preference, devoid of any
even minimal attempt at elaboration, reasoning, justification, or explanation,
a count could find that the speech was not on a matter of public interest.
After all, the plaintiff's speech in such a case would be almost purely self-
120. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114.
121. Note that alleged employee frustration and morale concerns did not reach the level of
matters of public interest in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
122. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114.
123. 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987) (5-4 decision).
124. Id. at 2895.
125. Id. at 2902.
126. Id. at 2896.
127. Id. at 2897 (quoting the Fifth Circuit's opinion below, 786 F.2d at 1236).
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referential, autobiographically reporting a certain mere undefended prefer-
ence of the speaker, however intensely held. That the plaintiff simply feels
strongly about some important hypothetical event need not in itself be a
matter of public interest, and her own speech reporting her strong feeling
need not be speech on a matter of public interest.
There is of course the possibility that the plaintiff would have elaborated
upon, or generalized, her declaration but for her being situationally blocked
from doing so, or that she did in fact so elaborate upon her comments. The
theory does not require generalization when generalization was in fact pre-
vented by immediate interrogation, by a speaker's supervisor. In addition,
the possibility of antecedent generalization must also be recognized. In this
case, the plaintiff testified without contradiction that her statement about
the attempted assassination was made at the end of a discussion about the
President's policies with a co-worker.'28 The preceding discussion by the
plaintiff supplies generalization under the ready generalizability theory. It
seems unlikely that the plaintiff's speech could in fact be easily generalized
to a further degree, but that the plaintiff frivolously cast opportunities for
further generalization away. 129 McPherson would under the ready general-
izability theory therefore involve non-MOPIC speech only if the plaintiff's
speech was a passing, unpursued, unintroduced remark, but should be
considered MOPIC speech under the facts presented. 30
The final category of the public employment discipline cases, which need
not be dwelled upon, consists of close cases in which the proposed approach
and that of the actual deciding court converge on a finding of speech not
on a matter of public interest. An example of such a case is Rowland v.
Mad River Local School District' In this case, the plaintiff Rowland's
128. Id. at 2895.
129. The burden of showing no easy further generalization of the speech should logically
rest on the speaker, as the party asserting the constitutional defense to the job discipline.
However, for practical reasons, it seems best to require the employer to bear the burden of
showing further generalizability, in some particular respect. Otherwise, the speaker is placed in
the logically demanding position of having to negate an infinite set of possible further ready
generalizations. For the Supreme Court's reluctance to impose a burden of proving a negative
in another speech context, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (seeking to relieve
prosecution of the allegedly undischargeable burden of proving that the work claimed to be
obscene was without any sort of redeeming social value).
130. For other examples of possible non-MOPIC speech under this theory, where the court
found otherwise, consider Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 814 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's
official investigatory conclusion that a particular fire involved arson); Greenberg v. Kmetko,
811 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff's expression of disagreement with various social casework
decisions), reh'g granted, vacated en banc, 820 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Town of
Elizabethtown, 800 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1986) (challenge before Town Board by clerk as to use
of facsimile stamp, notarization procedure, etc.); Collins v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp. 1464 (E.D.
Ark. 1983) (plaintiff circulated memo to his superiors and other co-workers focusing on possible
discipline of a superior officer who accused various jail employees of planning a walkout over
salary issues), aff'd per curiam, 734 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1984).
131. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
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contract as a public school guidance counselor was not renewed allegedly at
least in part, because she informed school personnel of her bisexuality. 3 '
While the rights of bisexual teachers may be considered a matter of public
concern generally, and while this particular case may have become something
of a local cause celebre,113 this case illustrates the application of the ready
generalizability theory. The plaintiff apparently reported her sexual prefer-
ences in a narrowly autobiographical, contextless way. Apparently the plain-
tiff declined the opportunity to tie her own circumstances to any broader
concerns.'3 4 That the plaintiff chose to only disclose a personal fact rather
than to disclose and elaborate or expound, in even a limited way, within the
limits of her ability under the circumstances, is not without implication for
the values underlying the free speech clause.' 3'
IV. CLOSE CASES ON THE MOPIC ISSUE IN THE LIBEL LAW CONTEXT
The approach to the MOPIC issue in the defamation cases precisely
parallels those cases discussed above in connection with the public employ-
ment discipline cases. Many of the recent cases, of which Greenmoss'16 is
preeminent, have been referred to above, and the reader is invited to trace
out the implications of the ready generalizability approach for any number
of cases.
If enough confidence can be developed in the ability of this approach to
sort out close MOPIC versus non-MOPIC cases in the defamation area,
there may be a significant special payoff. It may then be possible to dispense
with any consideration of the often difficult issue as to whether the plaintiff
in a defamation case is a private figure or a public figure of some sort. 3 7
132. Id. at 448.
133. See id. at 452, 453 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 449.
135. For additional cases in which the ready generalizability approach and that of the actual
court concur in finding the speech not to be on a matter of public interest, see Gomez v. Texas
Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 794 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1986) (statement by
state mental health facility employee to employee of county outpatient center of new state
policy that would place additional burdens on county center employee); Saye v. St. Vrain Valley
School Dist. RE-IJ, 785 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1986) (discussion by plaintiff teacher with two
parents of defendant's allegedly inadequate allocation of student aide time); Altman v. Hurst,
734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (police officer disciplined allegedly for, inter alia,
encouraging another officer to appeal her suspension), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
136. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
137. See the distinctions drawn, or sought to be drawn, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion). For the implication that the
MOPIC versus non-MOPIC distinction is constitutionally more significant than the public figure
versus private figure distinction, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (public had a high interest in whether magazines distributed by the plaintiff
were legally obscene). One need not agree with the Rosenbloom plurality on the level of
constitutional protection to be accorded defamatory speech on matters of public interest to
agree that the alleged public figure status, or not, of the speaker is constitutionally insignificant.
See Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo. 1982) (en
banc).
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If the speech is on a matter of public interest, it may be worth a given level
of protection through the free speech clause, regardless of the status of the
plaintiff. If the speech is not on a matter of public interest, it should
presumably receive a lesser degree of constitutional protection, even if the
plaintiff in the libel action is a public figure. This approach would correspond
with the underlying concern for the defense and pursuit of the values
underlying the free speech clause. It would also dispense with the embar-
rassing legal fiction that public figures have consented to, or assumed the
risk of, not merely harsh public evaluation, but also grossly negligent def-
amation. 3 '
With the possibility of increased clarity and logic in the constitutional law
of defamation at stake, consider a brief contrast in outcomes under the
ready generalizability theory in two defamation cases, both of which involve
allegations of organized crime associations. In Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Ex-
change,'39 the speech at issue was an insurance company employee's placing
a memorandum in internal company claim files stating that Mutafis was
"associated with mafia very heavily."' 4 In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 141 the speech was that of a Philadelphia newspaper that, in a series
of articles, asserted that Hepps had ties to organized crime and used those
ties to influence Pennsylvania state governmental processes.142
Both of these instances of alleged defamatory speech focus on organized
crime. Organized crime is undoubtedly a matter of public interest and
concern. Yet under the ready generalizability theory, the speech in Mutafis
H is best categorized as easy non-MOPIC speech, and the speech in Hepps
as easily on a MOPIC. Neither is a close case appropriate for the ready
generalizability approach. Hepps involved wide dissemination of speech il-
luminating alleged corruption in state government. Any plausible theory one
cares to enlist must find this to be speech on a matter of public interest.
Mutafis I, however, involved speech that was not intended for circulation
at any point to more than a handful of insiders, and the speech had no
institutional point or implication other than to discourage unwarranted
financial exposure by the insurance company in the case of a single individual.
It is possible to argue that if Mutafis H can somehow be seen as a close
case and therefore appropriate for our theory, the defendants' speech in
Mutafis H should be classified as on a matter of public interest based on
our theory, as it would be costly or impractical for the speaker in Mutafis
H either to circulate his thoughts more widely-as to competitors-or to
expand his remarks into an essay on the insidiousness of organized crime.
All of this analysis demonstrates that the case is in fact not close, because
138. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion).
139. 775 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) [hereinafter Mutafis I1]. The prior, more
factually detailed opinion in Mutafis is at 728 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Mutafis 11.
140. Mutafis 1, 728 F.2d at 673.
141. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986) (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 1560.
19871
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW
the institution of the confidential insurance files, in nature and purpose, is
largely foreign to the service or exercise of our basic free speech values. The
speaker may have bumped up against the speech-value enhancing limitations
of the institution of the insurance company, but the confidential insurance
company files, by their nature and purpose, have little to do with the aims
underlying the free speech clause.' 43
CONCLUSION
The ambiguity of the concept of the public interest, and the difficulty of
consistent application of this concept in close cases, provokes a certain
natural impatience. The concept is widely used in the law,M however, and
is in fact indispensible, in that it captures genuinely fundamental concerns.
Any conceivable replacement for the concept would involve much the same
difficulty of application. Disposing with the concept would not make the
legal landscape less ambiguous and logical, but simply unrecognizable. This
Article has therefore recommended a principled, yet pragmatic approach to
resolving the increasing number of the most difficult sorts of issues involving
this distinction in the important areas of public employee discipline based
on speech, in defamation, and less explicitly, but by the same logic, in
privacy cases. 1 45 The aim has been to lend some additional predictability and
consistency to the decisions, while strategically promoting the values that
lead us to constitutionalize free speech rights in the first place.
143. For cases compatible with this result, in the context of credit reports rather than insurance
company confidential files, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985); Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1987).
144. For a sampling of uses in other legal contexts of the public interest versus private
interest distinction, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987)
(dispute over the proper characterization of interests in health and safety in preventing coal
mining subsidence damage); Federal Communications Commission v. WNCN Listeners Guild,
450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981) (noting the absence of a statutory definition for FCC's mandate to
serve the public interest); Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, 719 F.2d 407, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984); Sidis
v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.) (upholding right of magazine to publish truths
about former child prodigy in contravention of the latter's privacy rights), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214 ("The right to privacy does not
prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest."); Note, Moving
Toward a Better-Defined Standard of Public Interest in Administrative Decisions to Suspend
Government Contractors, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 693 (1987).
145. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214; Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
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